Introduction
The joint increased international integration of emerging markets and the repeated incidence of financial crises in recent history have ignited a research agenda into the role of globally integrated capital markets in financial crises. More specifically, the concept of 'contagion' as a conduit for capital market turmoil has become an important focus. Contagion can be defined as the transmission of unanticipated local shocks to another country or market, resulting in an increase in correlation during periods of financial crisis (Masson, 1999; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) . The consequences of contagion can be staggering: for instance, real output losses during the Asian crisis have been estimated at 15% of GNP (IMF, 2001) . These crisis episodes have clearly highlighted the risk inherent to capital market integration for emerging market economies.
On the other hand, several studies suggested that global integration is beneficial to growth and employment. Models of international asset pricing under capital market segmentation usually predict that the integration of capital markets decreases the cost of capital as risk is internationally diversified (Stulz, 1999) . Empirical work also suggests that liberalizing restrictions on international portfolio flows tends to enhance stock price liquidity, which in turns enhances productivity and ultimately affect economic growth (Levine, 2001; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Patro and Wald, 2004) . For emerging market economies, the co-existence of gains and risks associated to financial integration is inherent to the relationship uniting market integration and vulnerability to financial contagion. More fundamentally, one might ask whether an optimal degree of financial integration exist, where an emerging market economy can reap the benefits of greater access to foreign capital without enduring the costs of contagion.
The objective of this paper is to answer part of the question by investigating the vulnerability of the emerging markets of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to various episodes of financial crisis.
As shown in table 1, the area has now overcome Latin America in terms of average market capitalization, liquidity and number of listed firms. However, only since the 1990's have the MENA countries embarked on financial liberalization policies, and with different timings (see FEMISE, 2005) . As a consequence, the MENA area actually encompasses markets of various sizes and maturity, from the largely capitalized stock markets of Turkey, Israel and Egypt, to the more thinly traded markets of Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon.
Previous research in the MENA stock markets has shown that these markets display opportunities for international diversification by displaying evidence for international segmentation and predictability (Lagoarde-Segot&Lucey, 2005(a) , (b); Girard ,2004) . However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on the transmission of international financial crisis in these markets. This paper constitutes a first attempt to fill this gap in the literature. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, the crisis definition and the dataset. Section 3 discusses our findings, and section 4 draws together our conclusions.
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Methodology, Data and Crisis Identification
Methodology
There is now a reasonably large body of empirical work testing for the existence of contagion during financial crisis. The seminal methodology used to analyze simultaneously falling stock markets over breakdown periods was to compare correlation coefficient with a benchmark (Longin&Solnik, 1995; Karolyi & Stulz, 1996) . However, it is now established that results from this approach can be biased.
First, the presence of heteroscedasticity in the studied markets makes it impossible to draw robust conclusion from simple correlation coefficients. It has been shown that heteroscedasticity is a typical feature of crisis periods since the latter generally corresponding to an increase in volatility (Forbes&Rigobon, 2002) . A second bias is that simple tests based on changes of coefficient can have low power (Dungey & Zhumabekova, 2001 ). Finally, bi-variate coefficient analysis implies that only pairs of markets can be analyzed, even though markets are part of a larger financial system (Baur&Fry, 2005) .
Several models of contagion have been developed over recent years in order to overcome the difficulties cited above (see Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez & Martin, 2004 Corsetti et al. (2002) version of the latter.
The fixed-effect approach
The first technique we employ is a multivariate test of contagion based on a panel data model which controls for common vulnerabilities through the inclusion of a world, regional and emerging equity market index. The framework is a basic regression model of the form:
Where is the return of country at time , and ε and are assumed to be independent and independently distributed with zero mean and unit variance.
As in Baur & Fry (2005) , the model differentiates between common vulnerabilities and contagion through the relative importance of the global and regional factors compared to the fixed time effects. It is assumed that vulnerabilities exist in both the benchmark and crisis period and capture the systematic relationship between the equity markets of each country and the region, emerging markets and the world. In this framework, the fixed time effect captures time-varying joint positive and negative movements across markets that are unexplained by the loading factors over the period of study. The idea is then that contagion occurs wherever these fixed time effects reach a certain threshold, highlighting the fact that asset prices are determined by a large unexplained common factor. We consider that the threshold is reached if the t-statistic of an estimate of the fixed effect is significant at the 5% level.
According to Baur&Fry, the advantages of this approach lies in that the model can endogenously determine contagion and hence avoid the sample selection bias discussed in Pesaran and Pick (2004) .
Moreover, the panel model is multivariate and therefore gives evidence of joint contagion through an estimation of global interdependencies. When investigating contagion in a specific region, it thus constitutes a useful complement to the bivariate framework.
2.1.2 The structural model approach Favero & Giavazzi (2002) have also proposed a methodology which also allows to endogenously define contagion by indentifying many short lived crisis periods associated with extreme returns. The idea is to implement a VAR to control for the interdependence between asset returns, and subsequently used the heteroscedasticity and nonormalities of the residuals from that VAR to identify unexpected shocks transmitted across countries, which are considered as contagion. The first step is to estimate a simple VAR and to consider the distribution of the residuals. Crisis observations are then defined through a set of dummies associated with extreme residuals for each country. Consider the following VAR model:
Where are pooled asset returns across the sample period, Where we define one single dummy variable per observation. These dummy variables are then included in the following structural model: 
However, this approach has been criticized by Corsetti et.al(2002) on the basis that it is built on arbitrary and unrealistic restrictions on the variance of country-specific shocks. Whereas the Forbes&Rigobon (2002) methodology identifies tranquil and crisis periods by different levels of asset return volatility, a change in variance might actually be driven by an increase in the variance of a common factor, which then causes unusual volatility in other markets. In this case, the event of a significant change in the magnitude of co-movement between markets does not necessarily require a rise in correlation between these markets; and contagion can be defined as the presence of comovements in significant excess from what could be expected from an unchanged transmission mechanism. Accordingly, the methodology proposed by Corsetti et.al (2002) consists of testing for structural breaks in the international transmission mechanism.
The model first creates data-generating process in country 1 and country 2, where country 2 is the country where the crisis occur:
Where s ' α are constants, 1 γ and 2 γ are country-specific factor loading, is a common factor, f i ε and j ε are country-specific factors. Correlation coefficients are defined as: (2002), who found that the US turmoil in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was among the fifteen biggest crash of the century, we also include these terrorists attacks in the crisis timeline. Finally, we also look at the effect of the American financial turmoil that followed the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals. Serwa and Bohl (2004) highlighted the magnitude of the latter by suggesting that it corresponded to a fall of 20% in the US index.
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The preliminary step to the investigation of contagion is the accurate identification of the crisis interval. This requires to divide the dataset into a stable and a turmoil period. Our starting dates are In order to neutralize the possible impact of different trading days, all series are smoothed using a twoday moving average filter.
Results and Analysis
We begin our investigation by asking whether the MENA markets are subject to common vulnerabilities, making them susceptible to shocks from neighbouring countries. Results of the estimation of the fixed time effect are shown in table 2, which reports an R² of 21.47% and an Fstatistic of 37.98 for this model.
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The world index which captures global vulnerability, and the MENA benchmark which captures regional vulnerabilities are significant with t-values of 2.8 and 8.14 respectively. However, the parameter estimate is sensibly higher for the regional benchmark (0.24) than for the global benchmark (0,09). According to Fry&Baur (2005) this finding can be explained by the fact that in the case of weakly traded markets, regional linkages are more important than world linkages due to the relative importance of regional trade linkages as compared to world linkages, which probably emphasize financial rather than economic linkages. The emerging market index is unsignificant, which reflects both the weak share of the MENA markets in emerging markets total capitalization and their segmentation with the world markets. The time series of the fixed time effect over the whole sample period, including the seven investigated crisis is presented in figure 1 . The first panel of the figure presents coefficients estimates and the second panel presents the t-values associated with critical values at the 5% significance level. Inspection of this figure shows the absence of joint contagion over the period of study, which suggests that the MENA financial markets are not vulnerable to regional realllocation of international portfolios in the event of a international financial crisis. Moreover, turning to bivariate results in the event of specific crisis, coefficients obtained from the fisher transformation reject the hypothesis of contagion, for each methodology. However, this result suffers from a statistical bias as the test relies on the assumption of normality.
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Using our refined t-statistic not only provides a more robust testing framework, but also uncovers a different story. Taking different methodologies altogether, there is suspicion for contagion for every single MENA market in at least one out of the seven crisis episodes. However, results are contrasted among countries. Israel and Turkey are the only two markets that we can suspect to have endured contagion during the Asian crisis, with the Corsetti framework. Moreover, looking at crisis episodes altogether, they also seem to be sample's most vulnerable markets: besides contagion from the Asian crisis, Israel was quite significantly affected by the Turkish crisis, while Turkey seems to have endured contagion during each american crisis ((in both correlation-based approaches). Considering that Turkey and Israel are the oldest, largest and most developed markets in the MENA, this finding can be explained by the fact that contagion requires a high participation of international investors in the afflicted markets.
On the other hand, we find very little evidence of contagion during the Russian, Brazilian, and Argentinean crisis. Along with the relative smaller impact of these crisis on the world's markets, the relative small size of the MENA markets and the prevalence of regional trade linkages might explain the absence of contagion, as it suggests that the sample countries were immune from balance of payment deficits and from the massive capital flights that were implied by the restructuring of international portfolios.
However, we can suspect that Egypt was affected by the Russian crisis (in the structural model approach); while Tunisia seems to have been quite significantly affected by the Brazilian crisis (in both the Forbes-Rigobon and Favero-Giavazzi approaches). These results might appear uncanny a first glance, especially given the small size of the Tunisian market. However, using daily indices in local currencies and a simple Johansen-Juselius methodology, we detect a cointegrating vector between each of these markets and our world benchmark. The EMU being these two countries' main trade partner, evidence in favour of interrnational financial integration suggests that contagion did not occur due to commercial deficits, but rather through a common creditor effect, or as the result of herding behaviours within the framework of pure contagion.
Finally, another striking fact is that evidence of contagion in the MENA seems to increase over time:
dropping the Argentinean crisis out of the analysis due to its local impact, and looking at the number of contagion relationships per crisis, we yield two relationships during the 1997 Asian crisis, four 
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to investigate vulnerability to financial contagion in a set of rapidly 
